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The social science analysis of the history of technologicai artifacts and investments \vas 
much developed in the last ten years. Social constructivists reformed the existing methods. 
Their approach is applied here to t he famous case of constructing a barrage system on 
the Danube. 
Keywords: social constructivism, history of technology, barrage system, science tech-
nology - society studies. disclosure. 
It is an article on the first phase of construction process of a barrage sys-
tem on the Danube. This process shows at least three peculiarities. One of 
them is the overwhelming role of the state, a characteristic of the engineer-
ing work in the late socialism. Another peculiarity is the role of the awaking 
public opinion during the last phase of the story. As a third one could be 
mentioned that the technological artifact acquired a strong symbolic im-
portance, even a changing one during its history. Nobody can seriously 
believe that the construction of any complex technological artifact is an 
issue of 'pure' engineering expertise but the Dam story is a rather unusual 
case, nevertheless. The fate of the barrage system became and continues 
to be a complex of political, ecological, economical and engineering issues. 
This complexity of the story makes it advantageous for cheking and de-
veloping some new approaches within technology studies, too. This is the 
perspective this article will take on the Danube-Dam case. There is a hope 
that a simultaneous effect can be achieved. The case can be enlightened if 
the method will be developed a bit further. 
Changing Research Leading Ideas 
STS-studies (Studies on Science, Technology and Society Relations, or to 
be shorter, science, technology and society studies) means an integrative, 
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social science approach aimed at exploring the complex unity of science 
and technology in society in which technological facts are to be seen as 'so-
cially constructed' and not as results of the simple integration of outputs 
of a:ltonomous scientific or engineering work and society outside. That is 
why STS type research is broader than, and different from the earlier so-
ciology of technology that only focused on the institutional, organizational 
framework of the technological content. 
It is rightful to look at the timely STS approaches as the result of 
a long attack on the earlier demarcationistic understanding prevailing in 
sci<;nce research until the late seventies and in technology research perhaps 
until now. According to the demarcationistic ideas, sociology concentrated 
on the institutional, organizational structure and dynamics of science and 
technology development leaving scientific knowledge and technological ar-
tifac'Js and the scientific research and technological construction work, i.e. 
the content of the process out of account. A persuasion was earlier accepted 
as the research leading idea that scientific knowledge and technology as 
knowledge and skill have their autonomous way of development following 
tbe given laws of these developments, at least in principle and as a norma-
ti;re idea. Society provides the needed initial conditions and institutional, 
organisational form - according to this Mertonian type of understanding. 
Tilese, the institutional and organisational forms were somehow accounted 
for as a bare vehicle for these autonomous processes. 
The classical approach thus excluded curiosity about the effects of 
the social in the development of scientific or technological contents. But it 
did Eot exclude the reverse interest, which means looking for the impact of 
scientific knowledge and technological artifacts on society. The researchers. 
who got interested in the exploration of these impacts, concentrated on 
the effects of scientific knowledge and technological artifacts as if they 
were outcomes of autonomous processes, without ho\v society 
formed this and the artifacts in tIle research iaboratories and 
designing departments. (And, of course, how society formed the attitudes 
in research labs and designing departments.) In other words, they reduced 
the mutual effect of society and science and technology on each other as if 
the feedback mechanism had not been more than the effect of science and 
technology on society plus the effect of society providing the institutional 
and organizational frame to an autonomous scientific and engineering work. 
The criticism of this reductionism in technology studies came from 
three different corners. One of them grew out of an alliance of some knowl-
edge sociologists and historians of technology [1.]. These researchers did 
not begin their work by the (recently valid) definition of the artifact un-
der investigation but they concentrated on the 'interpretive flexibility' of 
technological artifacts. They went back to the historically worked out 
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'meanings' of the technological artifacts under investigation and looked 
for the 'relevant social groups' defining the artifacts from their perspective 
on them. They began to emphasize the process when 'the relevant social 
groups' 'negotiated' the available definitions, tried to reject the others' and 
get recognized their own. They followed these debates until they got their 
'closure', this final step in the struggle for fixing the meaning and definition 
of the artifact under examination. 
Dealing with history in this manner they left aside and overcame a 
special type of a historicity of the earlier approaches. These approaches 
formed their research topic by acce:pt;mg 
Starting their 
developed r()n~:trllrtll~O' a special vie v; 
obvious precondition. 
being successful today, 
AI:::cording to this view 
success "vas explanlat,lOn and did not need any socia.l exp.;~;,.0.ation. 
Final success was seen by them as an indicator of a natural cha c3.ct,ris-
tics and history of the artifact \vas to be seen as the process to 
the ±:om the 
VerjF beginning. a mon)poly in 
research until nmv, history was somehow to be seen as if it had realized an 
inscribed plan (or what is the same an inscribed necessity). VVhat needed 
explanation was the set of obstacles to the chosen (by the end of th\: story) 
successful item and the process of how these obstacles could be put aside 
throughout history. According to this look the final success was somehow 
preprinted into these items by the autonomous lavvs of scientific cognition 
or the engineering work and the investigation of the social 'side' wa,:; to be 
reduced to the explcmation of how this inscribed success could be u'uolled 
during the process when society learned and understood it in history. The 
relation of success to history and society was reduced to a learning process 
instead of a genuine action. And indeed, provided society had not chc"nged 
its preconditioning of scientific and engineering work by changing value 
orientations, the historical social process of the consecutive series of ac-
tions in fact could have been reduced to a historical learning process much 
more. In contrast to the earlier methodology of exploring the obstacles to 
the finally successful item, realizing in this manner a sort of asymmetry, 
the new maxim became a sort of symmetry principle. According t·) this, 
success needed a social constructive explanation of just the same measure 
as failure. Concentrating now on technology, this maxim required t() look 
for those social changes that favoured one solution to the others. As men-
tioned earlier, the old type explanation believed to 'enlighten' how history 
had to strive for the state of the affairs we are living in now. (Small wonder 
if anybody considers that the recent success of the scientific or technologi-
cal issue to be investigated was taken out of the elements to be explained 
in advance.) The threat of the vicious circle was not seen because of the 
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previous postulation of a different, additional type of explanation of the 
successful, different from the historical. The vicious circle was avoided 
only by referring to the truth and, timeless, functionality, in other words 
to 'autonomous' laws of scientific cognition and engineering construction 
activity. But this behaviour could not prevent another circulation. Because 
the state of the art now as something non-historical was chosen to be the 
end of the historical explanation, the state of the art and the successful 
artifact itself was to be seen as a finished one. The explanation, according 
to the old maxim, has completed history by now, started from the present 
and having finished a photosafary of the past it arrived back to the same 
present. It did not lead to any statement of an open future based on his-
torical deduction. To open this completeness was kept for the future in the 
reality, the historical explanation had nothing to do with it. 
On the other hand, looking at success as completely historical and 
at any historical stage as included into human action the new maxim kept 
the way open to understand how the past not only produced the present 
as a state of affairs but also something full of alternatives, partly hidden 
behind the surface. 
The social constructivlstic approach to technology studies unified the 
criticism over the above mentioned 'modern mindedness' of the earlier \'Trit-
ing of history with an 'inside the black box' approach to the topics of in-
vestigation. Following this v,ray they tried to reconstruct how these, in the 
period of writing history successful artifacts got their 'natural' definition, 
which seemingly gave them their non-socially constructed character and 
their a-historicity. Important in this methodological approach has been, to 
put it differently, that it did not work with definitions taken from hand-
books or anywhere but concentrated on the reverse process, how an artiract, 
through which type of social construction process got its accepted 
definition( s). They not only dynamised the understanding of the construc-
tion process of technological slInLlltanec,u~;ly \,vith this 
looked at the walls 'bet'ween' SOCH:ty and technological artir2ucts as 
permeable ones. VVhat will be the 'pure' technological in a later period 
has been strongly socially constructed in the same process in 'which it got 
the appearance of technological. Technological artifacts got a deeply 
contingent character through this approach. 
An important feature or this nev; research attitude is the criticism 
of the barriers and the distorting nature of the disciplinary perspectives 
on the dynamics of technological change. The claim is that disciplinary 
perspectives, e.g. an economic history, a political history of technological 
change, etc., do not only give a strongly reductionistic and one sided un-
derstanding of the explored issues but also distort them. A well-known 
American historian, T. P. Hughes shows examples of how the complexity 
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of the historical process can be better reproduced when the investigator 
looks for a 'seamless web' in which the technological changes occur [2.]. 
Everything flows together in this 'seamless web' joining technological, eco-
nomic, psychic or political arguments in very peculiar structures by chance, 
providing the concretely needed bulk to overcome the barriers to techno-
logical innovation. His concept of 'reverse salients' helps to focus on the 
crucial barriers to technological innovations conceptualizing these barriers 
as complex social issues. 
A third root of research on the dynamics of technological 
change came from some French researchers. Their 'actor network' ap-
proach tries to avoid any difference betvv-een living and non-living actors of 
the story. (This is a step that has gone beyond my understanding several 
WIthstandIng the usefulness of the approach)(3.J. 
The new type exploration of the introduction of technological artifacts 
into society has been advancing much in the last years. Recent researches 
demonstrated the efforts of maintaining the demarcations and fixations, 
how the accepted 'definition(s)' were preserved and maintained by complex 
social processes and built into the firm structure of society. 
It is hardly surprising that even the new technology studies, in 
some respect, concentrated on successful stories. (Dealing with them, of 
course, as genuine social processes.) It is not without reason \J(,-hy a his-
torian is more inclined to explore the history of successful inventions than 
the history of failures. But a concentration on the successful technologi-
cal projects can only be justified by pragmatic reasons [4.]. Theoretically 
there must be a symmetry in research and failure stories must have a place 
together with the success stories on the same level of research. They are 
equally important in history, provided we accept a full-hearted social con-
structivist perspective. 
The story of the dam building is especially interesting for the 'social 
construction' type STS studies, because, instead of a success story, it has to 
deal with the reverse process. (Or the situation is even more complicated.) 
The reader will see how an initial 'closure' Vias set up. The whole process 
afterwards is the deconstruction of the initial closure, at least until 1989. 
New and new groups tried to develop and get through their definitions, 
according to their values differing from the initial ones, in an emerging and 
developing struggle for the redefinition of the technological artifact and 
'the technological debate' ended in a final, or through a look at the newest 
development, actually a semi-final disclosure by 1989. 
The research on failure stories is very rare until now [5.]. Thus, STS 
studies perspectives cannot only help understand the concrete case by pro-
viding some basic methodological guidelines, but, vice versa, the explo-
ration of the case by these new STS research means can make the STS 
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arsenal richer by an initial understanding of the reverse processes of get-
ting final disclosure. 
In this sense, as mentioned earlier, the exploration of the case is im-
portant from a theoretical point of view for STS studies. On the other 
hand, the case is important enough to reveal the decision mechanisms of 
how large-scale technological investments \yere constructed and realized in 
a socialist system. Moreover it can help \7i[estern readers understand hO'w 
two typical features of the political process, the so called overall planning 
and the autocratic state decision making, based on the highly totalitar-
ian structure of the system, perhaps surprisingly enough, were connected 
together. 
It has Deen nlentionea that the large-scale technological in-
Yestn1ent had its fixed definition \vhen the state-treaty "'i,,ras ulldersigned 
~n 1977, the disclosure became stabilized 1989, that means the 
seen as a fiasco and becan1e officially set 
process at In 
of the 2~rtifo"ct becamE and institutionalized. 
included 
of a vThole societal-economic formation. 
for theoretical reasons. 
ec:oloF;lc:al definition. 
its fi nal IOflTl 
the an additional canal finished in C~zech-
Slovakia just now. And some after the of the Danube 
clanl in (1zech-Sloyakia there is nov/ every sign of beginning ecological 
catastrophe on the Hungarian territory. But this is surely not an article 
that has to pass sentence on the story. The writer does not deal with 
the evaluation of who is right and in what extent. The aftermath story is 
interesting here because it may sho\,' something for STS - studies bringing 
the researcher nearer to the nature of 'technological' controversies. 
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C'Oris1ci"UC:tllll:!: a Danube - Darn In Late 
the First Phase 
A natural force of the magnitude of the Danube can be obviously used for 
different technological goals such as shipping, irrigation, energy production, 
entertainment, separation or connection of regions, diverting se\vage. The 
Danube can be utilized very and this allows us to guess a 
genttine place for social constructivistic interest. this v\~ide range of 
possible objectives and the multifunctional utilisatlc)n, it is small 
wonder that building a dam to the Danube can be ,JU"C""'-~' different 
objectives etc. 
et Danube as Cl 
unbroken shipping 
borderline betvieen 
became concern already in the 19th 
r- " '1 01 S2Ie ann 
or 
together 'Nith 
flood control. This is the tin1e "Yvhen the prilniti've land i.vas changed into an 
artincicl one, where agriculture and also its place. The idea of 
the utilizing the water for energy production came much later. Actually it 
vras seriously considered for the first time after the second world \var. This 
lateness is no \\Tonder for The Danube runs on a betv7een Hungary 
cnd Czech-Slovakia offering much less for energy production than in the 
mountains. 
}In in1ffieI1Se energy that v'/as caused by the beginning of ex-
tensive industrialisation. the project of the socialist inr:lustrialisation, ,vas 
in the background \vhen Hungary and Czechoslovakia agreed in 1953 on 
building up a clan1 Beside the state interest in raising energy pro-
duction the interests of the hydraulic engineering were much behind the 
project. Based on some new technological development, especiaily in the 
SU, but also in different VVestern countries a large scale utilisation of rivers 
of law gradient began. Nev! technological achie'l;ements made the utilisa-
tion of this type rivers hopeful for energy production. Energy production 
and irrigat.ion were the main objectives everywhere together 'with shipping. 
In the case of the Danube shipping did not play a role for the 'iron curtai.n' 
began at the frontier of these countries with Austria [6.]. NOhvithstanding 
the tremendous financial and the political problems concerning the dam 
building on the Danube and the open problems of the harmonizction of 
the different possible objectives of the Danube utilization the state deci-
sion was made favourable for the realization of a dam system, mainly for 
energy production, in the common effort of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. 
But the very serious economic crisis followed by a minor change in the 
political leadership in Hungary in the summer of 1953 stopped the further 
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construction work. We find a very reduced 'technological controversy' in 
this phase of the story. There was no social mechanism to form and ac-
centuate the possible different relations to the possible artifact. Decisions 
based on the persuasion of political leaders, mainly reinforced by experts 
called by them to the 'arena', fixed the overall structure of the possible 
objectives and the whole depended very much on contingent elements to 
be involved into the discussion process. Special industrial and engineering 
interests which were adapted to the overall political intentions and the very 
intuitive technological picture of the social tasks in the heads of political 
leaders fixed the 'interpretation' of the possible artifact in a very reductive 
way. Once fixed, once it became official, the 'interpretation' of the artifact, 
in our case defining the dam system as aiming at energy production, was 
preserved by political power. 
The idea was continuously worked on from 1958 in the 60s and 70s. 
One of the problems was that the project. still gave a very high priority 
to energy production. But hydraulic engineers could not fully persuade 
even the energy experts. Producing energy by the Danube could not be 
appealing enough for financial (and perhaps for lobby) reasons, either. Un-
til the 'energy crisis' in the eariy70s water energy production was worse 
economic possibility than, among others, the brown coal and lignite po'wer 
plants. (The comparison of the possible ecological damages was not a point 
of vieviT.) There were tviO possible lines to raise the persuasive capacity of 
the idea of the dam system. ""Ve follo-w here the argumentation of the 
well knoviTn environment protectionist, Jnos Varga, "lhen stating that to 
make the project of a Danube dam system more appealing the construc-
tors constantly had to raise the 2.TI10unt of energy to be produced by the 
in;'rll'n,Plf'ri'.r1r power station [7.]. In the early 50s the energy expected to be 
about 140 :MW. the final of 1977, it was raised to 
a lot of people and institutions, engineers and politicians 
looked at as an ener:e;e'llc lIr';est[n'~nt, other interests Vlere 
]Jl.!SIle,ci int,o the background. 
Some of these interests should be mentioned here. The agriculture 
rlf';o;.7·lv stood behind tile industry in the list of politicia.ns in any 
socialist country. Irrigation, underground Vi;ateT luanagement l,vas seen as 
less important than energy production. ..4..nother interest \vas of different 
nature. Any technological realization of the planned dam system, as men-
tioned already, was to be based on a previous political decision dealing 
with the problem that a shipping channel was either to be realized on the 
Czechoslovakian or on the Hungarian side bringing shipping practically to 
one of the mentioned countries. The realization of either of these technolog-
ical possibilities was changing the status quo, fixed by international treaty, 
according to which shipping was to be realized between the two countries 
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along the river. The agreement in the early 50s preferred the realization of 
an artificial canal on the Czechoslovakian side for minor rentability reasons. 
It was a decision that could be made easily when the national interests were 
pushed behind the so called 'internationalism'. Hungary practically lost the 
possibility of the utilisation of the Danube more than 20 long without any 
credit-entry. The other line to follow for raising the persuasive capacity 
of the plan was to develop a multifunctional utilisation of the artifact, a 
possibility that Vias strongly neglected in the early 50s. VVith respect to the 
peculiarities of distribution money in a socialist state this widening of the 
project could have had different aims in the background. different 
interests multifunctionality could help bringing the plan more appealing for 
political decision ma-kers. l\. Gr,C\"lZi'lnao inclusion of different interests in COffi-
pELHson to the 50s vvas one of the characte:Listic features of In 
of the 60s} and -;,vas reevaluated. But Jnos may 
have got right, when a lobby manipulation VIi-as guessed by him 
as follows. In case it could have been shown that the artifact had to realize 
a multifunctionality the costs became from blldgets differ-
ent from the energy sector. The costs became, in this meaning, relatively 
lower [8.]. From the viewpoint of STS studies it is important to state that 
the dam-building project got a reinterpretation toward multifunctionality 
from the 60s. A striking feature of the planning processes in the 50s is that 
there vIas an obvious indifference toward the byproduct of any industriali-
sation, tov\-ard sewage production. The Danube as sewage carrier was not 
in the forefront of the consideration list of the constructors and decision 
makers. The typical industrialisation ideology, "'lith its very reduced goal 
system and enthusiasm for reconstructing nature into an industrial object, 
was behind the process. This exaggerated, one-sided industrialisation ide-
ology caused a lot of harm in the leading industrial countries in the \lvest, 
too. But, concerning the social and environmental effects, it seems rightful 
to state a decisive difference. This difference in the effects may be caused 
by the difference of the political systems. That means that a totalitarian 
socialist system could stop in advance any possible protest coming from 
the private sphere, from independent social actors. Nationalising the deci-
sion system, reducing it to the closed relation of state bureaucrates and the 
technical experts (acknowledged by the state bureaucracy as well), it 'freed' 
the decision mechanism from a very important feed-back warning system in 
consequence the effects of a blind industrialism could be fuller. The energy 
crisis of the 70s was that made a decisive push on the large scale invest-
ment to which financial means continuously failed. The inter-state contract 
of 1977 fixed a variant of the large scale technological investment with a 
maximized energy productive capacity. Multifunctionality was taken into 
account as serving energy production. 
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One can be curious about the details how the basic ideas of the so-
cial constructive approach can be applied to the dam case. This artifact 
is s';uely open to 'interpretations', for it can be developed for different 
goais. But the hydraulic energy lobby had a decisive role in the prepara-
tory phase before and after the inter-state contract in 1977. There was no 
real 'controversy' among the different groups having different relation to 
the project interpreting the artifact differently. Nevertheless the hydraulic 
engineers had to persuade of the rent ability of the construction process not 
only the energy experts but also some other branches, too, especially the 
agl'ic ultural experts and the navigation. Their interpretation of the arti-
fact was not that much favourable as that of the hydraulic engineers'. But 
during the preparatory phase of the project, until 1977, the project slowly 
deve:0ped into a multifunctional one, into a project of a dam system con-
strue ted mainly for energy production, but at the same time, integrating, 
amo:,g other functions, the solution of secure shipping as well. The 1977 
conLact can be seen as the official 'closure'. The function(s) of the dam 
syste:11 project were fixed by the state and socialist countries had various 
~cal tools, including open violence to preserve the validity of the offi-
cid 'nterpretation'. This can be seen as the closure of the first part of the 
until the project became a staTe protected one in a fixed form. 
'The 
du 
eva~uated in 
cOnI,ection to the 
probably 
T'vvo ITIOre 
deve'lopec1 against r- '1 a TIxea 
phase. As mentioned 
technological planners to -:,/\:-icien 
even not 
agricuhure Vias re-
and comn1unal se\vage cl uring ca. 30 years "iilas order.) T"he second 
one \vas a nev; ecological consciousness pushing much more 011 
the preservation of natural environment, especially in comparison to the 
practically full neglection of this in the earlier period of indus-
trialisation ideology. The background, the system of the objectives to be 
considered for the technological construction work, begun to change. The 
agricultural interests in some measure, shipping were included into the ex-
tended construction work, much less the problem of sewage. But it seems 
not to be a mistake to state that the natural environment protection was 
fully neglected before 1977. It was together with the problem of diverting 
sewage and some other components that got included into the complex en-
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vironmental problem that became one of the mam points against the dam 
building by the 80s. 
Three other components of the resistance in the 80s Viere 'preprinted' 
the earlier decisions. "Ve mentioned already that the technological de-
cision had a component dealing vlith national interests yvhen the decision 
fell for the favour c..,n artificial canal. The changing of na,-:~iol1al 
interests the 80s with it at least a new accent m the eyalua-
also mentioned that the 
\,AlaS of a, socialist omitting every-
ensemble set 
studies trns pre)~ Ta.!"ory 
a ( 3uccessfur 
our earlier statement about 
the energy crisis in the 70s tog<':t,tleT \A'"ith the energy 
tlernent stabilized decision on ITlade one 
of c, Danube dam "",,,t,,,,~~ the offi-
fixed one. l\J,either earlier nor much later \vas the situation fav(lurable 
From of the IS of less 
in.terest then for the 1l1?:oLUlld.1l. IS c l/arianT of ho\v successful a :t-~facts 
may~ be The reverse process IS more for thfor.'~tica.l 
reasons. for it 1S rather This is -\"y- hen t he realisation cf a DHee 
fixed \yill lead to i"Gs and realisation. 'I'he second 
construction process of the dan1 15 an 
of this_ For editorial reasons an anoTher art~cle tries TO 
the rnechanism of this disintegration. 
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